

Climate change, equity and development – India's dilemmas

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Climate change confronts the world with epochal environmental and development challenges. The causes of climate change lie primarily in the historical greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of the developed countries of the North, called Annex 1 countries in the UN climate convention. These account for three-fourths of all GHGs accumulated in the atmosphere. But the effects of climate change are concentrated in the South, where four-fifths of the world's peoples live.

It is thus evident that at its core, climate change is about equity and justice. This is certainly true in terms of North-South relations, but also in terms of inequalities within countries – both in the North and in the South. This article seeks to discuss both these challenges – globally, and with a particular focus on India. India has traditionally taken a strong stand for equity in international negotiations, insisting that rich Northern countries accept and deliver on their historical responsibility, and that poor countries of the global South must have the right to 'development' and access to the rapidly shrinking 'atmospheric space' that remains.

This stand is undeniably justified and reflects the right of developing countries to find ways to meet the basic needs of their people. Yet, this very notion of equity is deeply contested and constitutes a fault line in the international negotiations. The rich Annex 1 countries have failed to live up to even a fraction of their commitments and responsibilities. This immoral and unacceptable state of affairs must be exposed and rectified.

However, while deploring the role of the historically biggest polluters, it is also important to scrutinise the rhetoric deployed by governments of the South. Does their insistence on equity also hold within their own boundaries? Are their action plans and domestic policies in line with the harsh reality of climate science and the need for *all* countries to more or less soon reduce and eventually eliminate GHG emissions?

What are the nuances and internal political battles within a country such as India, and what are the global implications? Without for a moment

minimising the legitimacy of the demands placed on Annex 1 countries by developing countries, and the latter's claims to a fair share of the remaining carbon budget (and compensation for historical emissions), Indian scholar-activists, citizens and others must also question the country's own elites, scrutinise the often conflicting motives of those in power, and, most importantly, insist on and mobilise forces for a radical transformation of development models away from consumerist, Western-inspired ideals to truly sustainable, resource-lean alternatives with a much higher quality of life. Domestic actions and policies must be consistent with demands and behaviour at the international level.

International inequity

Let us first look at the international, North-South dimension. The South is far more vulnerable to climate change because of geographical, atmospheric and hydrological factors; its poverty, undeveloped infrastructure, lack of early warning systems and emergency preparedness; its low capacity for adaptation; and the poor availability of resources for relief and rehabilitation. These factors are compounded by the indifference or apathy of bureaucracies towards underprivileged people, and not least, relatively low public awareness of climate issues.

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Joel Bassuk / Oxfam

The climate crisis is a double whammy for the South. And it is especially harsh on its poor. This was recently underlined by UNCTAD's *Least Developed Countries Report 2010*. The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) account for less than 1 per cent of the world's total GHG emissions, but the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events in them are five times higher now (519 events in 2000–2010) than during the 1970s (UNCTAD, 2010:116). In the last decade, about 40 per cent of all casualties related to natural disasters were found in LDCs, the poorest countries of the world (UNCTAD, 2010:116).

This is doubly unjust. The crisis cannot be resolved unless the world upholds the twin principles of environmental effectiveness and development with equity. A change of direction, and strong moral and political leadership that produces an emergency action programme, are needed to avert a catastrophe. This programme must include deep and early emissions cuts by the North, a serious commitment by the emerging economies to reduce the growth of their emissions and major initiatives for adaptation and low-carbon technology development worldwide.

The North owes a climate debt to the South. And it will continue to rise unless the North reduces its GHG emissions drastically – by at least 40–50 per cent by 2020 (over 1990), and eliminate them altogether in the following two decades. The North's past emissions, coupled with its failure to reduce current emissions substantially, have left only a minuscule carbon budget on which Southern countries must draw to pursue their development goals of providing their poor people a modicum of food and water security, healthcare, literacy, elementary education, access to energy and employment security.

The longer the North delays making deep emissions cuts, the smaller the development space left for the South. In effect, the North is squatting in global climate space, and depriving the South of access to it. The North must vacate the space.

By 2009, the world had already exhausted one-third of its CO₂ budget (1,000 billion tonnes, or gigatonnes) for the first half of this century, a budget compatible with a 2°C rise in average global temperatures. The world has spent 44 per cent of the stricter budget (750 Gt) demanded by CO₂ stabilisation at 350 ppm corresponding to a likely 1.5°C global warming level (Athanasίου et al., 2009). There are no signs that the globe's principal emitters will act urgently to cut their GHG emissions aggressively so as to remain within this budget. They have failed so far even to pledge the requisite emissions reductions.

After the Durban UNFCCC conference in November–December 2011, which failed to agree to urgent emissions cuts and postponed all serious climate mitigation actions beyond 2020, global warming is set to rise 3–5°C (over preindustrial temperatures) instead of the 1.5–2°C threshold the Earth can tolerate. Durban's key outcome, 'The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action', represents a big setback and continues the retrogression begun at Copenhagen.

Under the pledged reductions, CO₂ concentrations will probably spurt to 700 ppm, if not 800 ppm, and global warming will rise to 3–4°C, even

5–6°C.¹ This will produce absolute climate havoc, cause colossal physical and economic damage, threaten millions or even billions of livelihoods and displace people on a scale never before witnessed. Some eminent scientists warn that only a small fraction of the world's population, perhaps 10 per cent, will survive at 4°C global warming (*Scotsman*, 28 November 2009).

The Global South, beginning with the small island states and coastal LDCs, including large parts of India, will be the first victims of catastrophic climate change, which now seems next to inevitable.

The South faces a great dilemma. In the absence of affordable and adequate low-carbon alternatives, much of the South can only pursue its development goals by relying on fossil fuels, which will raise emissions in the short run. As Baer et al. (2008) put it: 'From the South's perspective, this pits development squarely against climate protection... The developing countries are quite manifestly justified in fearing that the larger development crisis, too, will be treated as secondary to the imperatives of climate stabilisation.'

Climate change thus translates not just into an environmental crisis, but also into a development crisis that threatens the poor. This greatly narrows the South's options, although it does not eliminate them. In both the 1.5°C and 2°C pathways to stabilising global warming, the South is left with remarkably little carbon space even if the North undertakes much deeper emissions cuts than currently pledged. The South's emissions must peak only a few years after the North's, and thereafter decline continuously till 2050 (Baer et al., 2008).

Yet, the South cannot simply be asked to undertake emissions cuts, certainly not legally binding ones, until it has addressed a good part of its development deficit. Equally, the North must accept the obligation to provide financial and technological support to enable the South to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This raises major issues of North-South and rich-poor equity, environmental responsibility, mitigation obligations and burden-sharing.

The climate negotiations impasse shows that the world is currently unable to muster a worthy response to a crisis that threatens millions of lives in the short run, and ultimately the survival of humanity itself. The world's political, corporate and military elites seem to be losing the will to combat climate change. They are increasingly inclined only to manage its consequences – by policing or suppressing protests arising from economic and environmental crises, acquiring emergency powers,

¹ See <http://climateactiontracker.org/news/128/Governments-set-world-on-more-than-3C-warming-still-playing-with-numbers.html>

suspending civil and political rights, using force to quell conflicts and building up formidable security apparatuses. Efforts are under way to convert the climate crisis into a security threat.²

The climate crisis is deepening just as the world faces numerous other crises, which feed on one another. The world is still in the grip of the worst global economic recession and sovereign debt crises in decades. There is a worsening social crisis, with increasing poverty in both South and North, expanding income inequalities, undermining of social cohesion and the ugly spread of Social Darwinism. The global environmental crisis is worsening by the year with the loss of biodiversity, disappearance of species and the unrelenting pollution of land, water and air.

The global political crisis is manifested in a severe erosion of people's participation especially in the 'mature' democracies, marginalisation of citizens and the snatching of decision-making powers from the public and parliaments and their concentration in the hands of capital and unaccountable international institutions.

This occasions critical reflection on many issues: anomalies in the dominant market-based economic model pursued by a majority of countries; transition to low-carbon lifestyles based on a qualitatively different relationship between production, consumption and natural resources; and the urgency of ensuring that underprivileged people – the worst victims of climate change – do not suffer further pain because of the world's failure to negotiate an effective climate agreement. Ultimately, resolving the climate crisis will necessitate a structural transformation of existing relations of power in many spheres and a sea-change in the manner in which society is governed.

India: The domestic context

These challenges are strikingly evident also when considering intra-South inequities and inequalities within nations and regions in sharing the burden of emissions mitigation. These are enormous. For instance, in India, disparities in per capita emissions between the top and bottom districts or prefectures are of the same order or even higher than global North-South differences in per capita emissions.

The climate crisis thus confronts India with many questions. India is emerging as a major power, despite the persistence of mass deprivation and poverty. Yet, there is little genuine domestic debate on how and to what ends India should deploy its growing power. How can it be used

² Two such attempts were indeed made in the UN Security Council in 2007 and in July 2011. Many Southern states opposed them.



UN Photo/Kibae Park

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to make the world less unequal, unjust, conflict-prone and violent? The Indian elite relishes power and recognition, but it does not pause to ask what purposes India's power should serve.

The climate crisis should bring home to Indian policy-makers the reality of many domestic, regional and global asymmetries in the distribution of power and privilege. Not only is addressing such challenges a moral imperative, it would also provide vastly more traction and a more solid basis for tough and principled negotiations internationally.

India has a vital stake in combating climate change because it is highly vulnerable to it. India's growth process has resulted in extensive environmental damage and degradation, which heightens its vulnerability. With a 7,500 kilometre coastline, many large floodplains of monsoon-fed rivers and high livelihood dependence on agriculture, India stands to lose heavily from cyclones and coastal storms, erratic rainfall patterns and more frequent floods and droughts, leading to low crop yields, more hunger and forced migration.

The global climate negotiations confront India with a huge challenge: reconciling the objectives of 'development' and poverty reduction with the global responsibility – and an obligation to its own citizens – to contribute to the fight against climate change. This entails combining developmental equity with environmental effectiveness, a task never before attempted anywhere on such a scale.

Hiding behind the poor through per capita norms

So how is India doing, as seen within a domestic context? In many ways, India has tried to rise to the challenge, somewhat reluctantly, and in a manner that is often awkward, inadequate, ambivalent, and in part even negative and obstructionist. India asserts that all human beings must have equal access to global environmental resources (or 'climate space'). Hence, India will ensure that its per capita emissions will never exceed those of the North. That is the only long-term climate-related commitment that India accepts. India refuses quantitative emissions reduction obligations not only now, but also for the foreseeable future, although it has offered to reduce by 2020 the emissions intensity of its GDP by 20–25 per cent (over 2005 levels).

Climate equity, the current Indian mantra internationally, has many dimensions, however. These include equity *within* nations and between them; equity in respect of current and future emissions vis-à-vis historical emissions; North-South environmental equity – subject to a right to the minimum necessities of life for underprivileged people; convergence between nations in the carbon intensity of GDP; equity in

burden-sharing for remedial action; equity in respect of the technological and financial capabilities of different societies and classes to meet their climate-related obligations; and so on.



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Indian policy-makers remain fixated on only one, limited, notion of equity anchored in national per capita emissions. But this means little in a society as deeply divided and unequal as India's, where the average individual emissions of the rich exceed those of the poor by perhaps five to 10 times. Consumption by the affluent is the main driver of India's rising emissions curve.

The per capita norm is a shield that enables India's elite to *hide behind the poor* while indulging in profligate consumption and evading responsibility towards the underprivileged in its own society – an overwhelmingly important imperative – to which it pays only rhetorical obeisance.

The climate debate should provoke serious engagement with the Gandhian legacy of austerity premised upon a radical critique of industrialism and consumerism. Although Indian policy-makers pay lip service to it, they despise the Gandhian legacy. But the legacy survives among a majority of Indians in the simplicity and frugality that is part of their life. Elements of the legacy are built into what has been called 'the moral economy of the poor' (Thompson, 1993). It is necessary to integrate it into a needs-based development model, at the core of which lie social and economic justice, climate equity and environmental sustainability. Such a model must recognise that the pursuit of artificial wants spurs unbridled consumption. It must reject the market as the principal allocator of resources.

National Action Plan for Climate Change (NAPCC)

The reality of Indian policy-making is at the other end of the spectrum of the legacy of Gandhi's vision and the broad, participatory, democratic approach that is needed. Let us zoom in on an illustrative example, the formulation of the NAPCC.

The making of India's climate policy and global negotiations strategy takes place within a small cloistered group of politicians and bureaucrats, without broad consultation with independent experts, people's movements, civil society organisations or concerned citizens, leave alone those liable to be affected the most by climate change.

India's apex advisory body on climate matters, the Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change, has a remarkably lopsided composition. The 26-member council is heavily dominated by ministers and serving or retired bureaucrats. There are only two women and only one proper NGO representative on it. Worse, all except one of its members

are based in India's capital and its suburbs, the sole exception being industrialist Ratan Tata, from Mumbai.

India hastily announced in mid-2008 that it had drawn up the NAPCC. The plan fetishises GDPism or obsession with rapid growth, and fights shy of setting realisable targets and timelines. Its very starting point identifies not development but 'rapid economic growth' as India's paramount priority, and defines the real 'challenge' as maintaining such growth while meeting climate obligations (Government of India, 2008).

The operational content of the plan lies in the eight different national missions that were simultaneously announced by the Indian government. These are the National Solar Mission, National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency, National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture, National Water Mission, National Mission on Sustainable Habitat, National Mission for Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystem, National Mission for a Green India and National Mission for Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change. Each mission, according to the NAPCC, will be tasked with evolving specific objectives until financial year 2016-17. The plan originally mandated the nodal ministries/agencies to submit eight comprehensive mission documents by the end of 2008, to be approved by the Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change.

The deadline was missed by years at least partly because of bureaucratic lethargy. The drafting process was almost entirely left to ministry officials and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), advised by a few individuals. In formulating the detailed mission documents, no consultations worth the name were demanded, and none took place, with independent experts, non-governmental organisations, civil society groups or the general public except in the Green India mission case.

Worse, the treatment accorded the mission documents and the missions themselves testifies to a cavalier attitude towards the NAPCC. Many of the mission documents have still not been finalised. Nor do they contain, as they should, strategies, operational plans, timelines and budgets. They are in varying stages of revision and reformulation. Some missions have been 'approved in principle'. Yet others have borne the description 'Final Draft' since April 2009 and even December 2008. Some missions have been orphaned by the nodal ministries. The PMO has not knocked the documents into shape, harmonised their format or integrated them into a revised NAPCC .

All but two of the NAPCC's eight national missions are of marginal or symbolic value. The Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, being



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launched under the brand 'Solar India', is the most ambitious mission of all. Its latest, thoroughly revised, *avatar* has the merit of laying down some time-bound targets. The National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency document too outlines some goals, strategies and action plans, with budgets and timelines, although it has fuzzier targets.

The missions on sustainable agriculture and water are based largely on recycling existing programmes, with some add-ons and without major changes of approach. The National Mission for a Green India emphasises reforestation of over 5 million hectares. The other documents only partially cover their mandate, are vague about objectives and strategies, have no coherent action plans, and largely rehash and restate existing plans and programmes.

The NAPCC greatly disappointed those who expected it to convey an acute sense of the gravity of the climate crisis and of the urgency of corrective action; to set some domestic targets, even if voluntary and moderate ones, for reducing emissions in relation to business-as-usual scenarios; and to clearly enunciate India's priorities.

Such enunciation could only have been based on a candid analysis of why India's present growth strategy is part of the problem, not the solution; why India's emissions are rising about twice as rapidly as the global average; and in what measure its people, in particular the poor, have become vulnerable to climate change. Equally, the analysis would have focused on averting and discouraging emissions-intensive growth, reducing inefficiency, adopting a sustainable urbanisation model and changing elite lifestyles. Alas, the plan falls way short of this.

There is a huge void in the NAPCC. It makes no commitment to equity or redistribution, which is of pivotal importance given the huge disparities of wealth, income and consumption in India's super-hierarchical society. The plan only speaks of 'the principle of equity' at the global level, and that too in per capita emissions. It pledges 'a qualitative change of direction', enhanced 'ecological sustainability' and 'inclusive and sustainable development'. But this is not reflected in the approaches and measures actually outlined in the plan.

Thus, the plan does not aim at radical change in the prevalent pattern of consumption, which has led to a sharp rise in India's overall emissions, much of it attributable to the luxury consumption of the affluent. Rather, its emphasis by and large is on maintaining existing growth and consumption patterns, including elite lifestyles, while improving the efficiency of energy use, promoting renewable energy to some extent

and adopting some new market-based instruments or administrative means to achieve limited goals in a few other areas. That does not add up to a change of direction.

The plan is totally silent on adaptation to climate change except for listing a slew of already existing social sector schemes, which do not properly belong to that agenda and were launched independently of it. Adaptation is critical for India, but the plan does not attempt to discuss the content and substance of adaptation, leave alone outline an overall strategy or ecosystem-based and sectoral programmes for reducing vulnerability and increasing people's resilience.

Above all, the NAPCC *lacks a long-term vision*, a coherent strategy and an overarching policy thrust. It sets no short-, medium- or long-term goals, and for the most part, no physical targets. It offers no baseline data on current GHG emissions from different sources or sectors – it uses outdated official estimates going back to 1994 – and their likely trajectory. Nor does it commit itself to pathways to low-carbon development, to be routed through quantifiable targets and goals. Similarly, it sets no targets for reducing the energy or carbon intensity of the economy and of major industry groups.

Understanding Indian climate politics

How does one understand Indian climate politics? What is its context, as defined by the realities of existing power equations? What explains the insufficiencies and flaws in the NAPCC and its failure to take the bold steps that are necessary?

Currently, three different strands or strategic lines of thought dominate Indian climate policy discourse. There is a great deal of interaction and sometimes an overlap between their proponents. They are in a state of mutual competition and yet amenable to reconciliation, even if awkward.

The first strand might be called the '*Cynicism of the Indifferent Outsider*'. It holds that the climate crisis is 'their' (the North's) problem: we have nothing, or very little, to do with it. 'They' created it, they aggravated it, now they must resolve it. India at best has only a peripheral role in the business of stabilising global warming. We account for just 4-5 per cent of global emissions and we can go even higher without causing real harm to the world. After all, did the world protest when China grew at a furious pace and increased its emissions massively in the 1980s and the 1990s? Why can India not get a 20-year-long breathing space?

The first strand in Indian climate policy might be called the 'Cynicism of the Indifferent Outsider'... We must concentrate on rapid GDP growth and quickly reach a point where the world has no choice but to listen to India – when India's economy reaches a certain size and its political clout becomes massive. Meanwhile, let the Kyotos, Copenhagens and Durbans go on.



Richter Frank-Jürgen

Above: Gulu Lalvani, Chairman, Royal Phuket Marina, Thailand, at the 2010 Horasis Global India Business Meeting - Does India have the right infrastructure to drive double-digit growth?

If the world does not respect India's right to grow and prosper – without exploiting other nations and peoples, as the Western colonial powers did – then we should be happy if the climate negotiations collapse or fail to produce an ambitious, effective and enforceable deal. Maybe we should even work for that outcome. That will at least give us some breathing space. We must concentrate on rapid GDP growth and quickly reach a point where the world has no choice but to listen to India – when India's economy reaches a certain size and its political clout becomes massive. Meanwhile, let the Kyotos, Copenhagens and Durbans go on.

The second strand may be described as '*Engagement with Entitlement*'. It believes in real engagement with the UNFCCC process and also in taking domestic actions independently. Its theme runs thus. Climate change is a serious issue. It is also *our* issue. We must embrace low-carbon development. If we do not join the fight against climate change, it is our people who will suffer.

A good climate agreement that is tough on the North and lenient towards the South should be India's *first* choice. But a full-fledged, new and legally binding post-Kyoto treaty that imposes tough obligations on any Southern countries will not be in India's interest. India's *second* choice, if the North does not face up to its responsibility to take the lead with drastic emissions cuts, will then be a weak deal like Copenhagen or Cancun, with voluntary pledges by all. This would be vastly preferable to a high-ambition deal that imposes stringent obligations with little or no differentiation between Northern and Southern countries in the future.

The third strand is best termed '*Bargaining-Oriented Pragmatism*'. It emphasises bargaining in contrast to principles, rights or entitlements. It does not put a premium on India's entitlement to greater climate space. Nor is it particularly keen on a specific outcome from the talks, other than that it should not impose a cap on the emerging economies' emissions. Rather, it focuses on getting the best out of a climate deal whenever it happens: large financial transfers; room for further expansion of fossil-fuel use in the South; and continuation of the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism. This approach is compatible with both a bad outcome or failure of the climate talks, as well as a more positive agreement.

This third approach is deeply irresponsible in that it promotes a passive and tailist attitude. Some of its proponents do not limit deal-making to climate-related bargains, but look for climate-unrelated 'grand bargains' such as a permanent seat for India on the Security Council, a decisive pro-India shift in the US-India-Pakistan relationship or a special 'side deal' in world trade negotiations. At a minimum, they want to leverage India's position as a booming market to drive a better climate-plus bargain.

The contestation between these different strands is unresolved. Regardless of which of the three strands eventually prevails, the overall prospect is not exhilarating. A *fourth strand* is what's needed, one which would be based on equity (also in the domestic context) and high ambition in terms of transforming society and putting it on a truly low-carbon trajectory. This strand would question and reject the present over-riding growth-centred neoliberal mindset. For such a new, positive, strand to emerge anytime soon, one which is deeply committed both to a worthy global climate deal and to low-carbon growth in India, public opinion must radically change, grassroots movements actively engage with the climate agenda and political parties get into the climate debate with a progressive approach.

Taking leadership

The ethical foundations of India's professed climate policy are based on narrow and internally inconsistent notions of equity in its environmental as well as developmental dimensions. For all the elevated rhetoric about justice and equal rights, India's positions essentially articulate the interests of its small but exceedingly powerful consumerist elite, roughly 10 to 15 per cent of the population, which has a high stake in raising its emissions and believes it has the 'right' to 'get even with' the North, no matter what happens to the climate. India's privileged minority cynically chants the mantra of North-South justice in pursuit of this 'right'. But it can obviously suddenly swerve to supporting a thoroughly unprincipled and ineffectual deal, as happened at Copenhagen and Cancun.

India must indeed stand firm in its insistence on international climate justice and securing atmospheric space for its population in both UNFCCC and other forums, but it must also face the full implications of the climate challenge at home. Climate change demands a radical agenda of redistribution – both in the South and in the North – and requires true leadership from a country such as India and its allies within, for example, the BASIC grouping.³

If India and the other BASIC countries want to remain relevant, they will have to do much more than blandly reaffirm the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). Gradations and nuances must be added to CBDR in keeping with contemporary realities, and in line with the fourth, truly equity-oriented strand outlined above. Such a modified approach must shape policy-making that is coherent in both its international and domestic dimensions.

Climate change demands a radical agenda of redistribution – both in the South and in the North – and requires true leadership from a country such as India.



The World Wants a Real Deal

3 India had a major part in bringing together the BASIC grouping, comprising Brazil, South Africa, India and China, just before Copenhagen in December 2009. This was a landmark development representing new self-assertion on the part of emerging economies in the UNFCCC negotiations. BASIC, whose GHGs are growing faster than the world's, was formed soon after China surpassed the US as the world's biggest emitter in absolute terms, and the perception grew that the new bloc would play a key role in the talks.

Developing countries, although much poorer than even the less affluent Northern nations, together now account for 55 per cent of global emissions. BASIC is under growing pressure to accept binding obligations, albeit less stringent than the North's. While insisting on fairness and differentiation according to clear equity principles, such as, for example the Greenhouse Development Rights framework (Baer et al., 2008), India and BASIC should take moral leadership and offer pledges that would further shame and make it more difficult for the North to duck its obligations. BASIC must support the G77's effort to defend the gains of past UNFCCC negotiations, preserve the Kyoto Protocol's rational kernel of science-based aggregate, top-down emissions reductions and promote cooperative action based on international solidarity.

India and BASIC should categorically declare that they want a strong, fair, ambitious and binding climate deal and that they are prepared, in the world's long-term interests, to sacrifice perceived short-term gains for their elites from any low-ambition deal – no more Copenhagen Accords in the future. Second, they must show they accept their share of climate responsibility regardless of the North, by launching significant voluntary domestic efforts at mitigation, adaptation and clean technology development even without external support. These must have a strong equity component.

Thirdly, India and BASIC should offer generous, unconditional financial and technological support for adaptation and mitigation in the LDCs and small developing countries with low capacity. Altogether, this would further expose the North's failure to take responsibility, shift the moral leadership and help break the current deadlock – something that might eventually contribute to a just and ambitious climate deal.

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